Are people's attitudes towards referenda as a decision-making procedure driven by their material self-interest, or do individuals predominantly value direct democracy as such, regardless of the material payoffs associated with anticipated policy outcomes?
Introduction
There is a well-established literature in political economics that analyzes the effect of institutions and constitutional rules on economic and social outcomes (see Persson and Tabellini 2003, Acemoglu et al. 2005 , and Voigt 2011 for surveys). More recently, however, researchers in political economics have started to endogenize the choice of these institutions, explaining the emergence of different "rules of the game" as the outcome of a struggle between different interests in a heterogeneous society. Diverse as they may be, these contributions share a common logic: individuals prefer those procedures which maximize the likelihood that the eventual political-economic equilibrium furthers their material interests. 3 While the logic underlying these contributions is consistent with economic reasoning, it does not go uncontested: in a recent contribution, Rodrik (2014) deplores the rather negligent treatment of "ideas" in the political-economic analysis of policy innovations, arguing that "…much human behavior is driven by abstract ideals, sacred values, or conceptions of loyalty that cannot be reduced to economic ends" (Rodrik 2014:191) . In a similar spirit, political science, psychology and behavioral economics offer a wealth of alternative motives beyond pure material interest that contribute to understanding the choice of decision-making procedures. Given the potential relevance of intrinsic motives, which evaluate procedures with respect to their transparency, fairness, practicability etc., but not with respect to their consequences for individual payoffs, the importance of instrumental motives, emphasized by standard economic analysis, is ultimately an empirical question.
In this paper, we put the idea that material interests are important in shaping individuals' preferences over alternative decision-making procedures to a test: we use data from a self-designed survey among German residents that asks individuals whether they support the use of referenda as a procedure to decide on redistributive taxation. Along with the answer to this question, the survey provides us with information on respondents' general support for direct democracy and for government interventions in favor of lower economic inequality, as well as on their income and other socio-economic characteristics. Most importantly, the survey asks participants whether 3 they expect a clear majority of the population to be in favor of or against higher taxes.
Unlike other empirical studies of endogenous constitutional choice, we thus do not have to rely on a mere conjecture that individuals are able to correctly anticipate the political-economic equilibrium emerging from alternative constitutional choices.
Instead, these expectations are made explicit by the survey data, and we can test the simple hypothesis that individuals with a lower (higher) income are more (less) likely to support referenda if they expect a clear majority to be in favor of higher taxes. If the support (or rejection) of direct democracy was predominantly driven by intrinsic motives -say, the belief that referenda are an optimal procedure in terms of fairness, transparency and practicability -neither individuals' income nor their expectation about the majority's position should play a role for their procedural preferences.
Our empirical results, however, support the notion that material self-interest does matter for individuals' preferences over decision-making procedures: while income per se does not affect respondents' support for direct democracy, its marginal effect is negative for those individuals who expect that a clear majority of the population is in favor of higher taxes. This result holds even if we control for other -intrinsic or instrumental -motives that may determine individuals' procedural preferences. And it demonstrates that money is where the fun ends: however large the enthusiasm for direct democracy may be on principal grounds, this support is severely dampened once individuals expect their net income to be reduced if referenda are used to decide on tax issues.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 surveys the relevant literature, while Section 3 presents a simple model that motivates the subsequent empirical analysis. Section 4 introduces the structure of our survey data set. In Section 5, we test whether the desire for redistributive taxation is affected by respondents' income. Section 6 turns to individuals' support for referenda as a mechanism to decide on taxes. We first analyze the direct effect of income (along with other potential determinants). In a next step, we then explicitly consider respondents' expectations on the majority's position. Section 7 offers a summary and some conclusions. Regression outputs as well as detailed definitions and information on our survey data are given in the Appendix. 4
Related literature
Our study is related to several strands of literature: the notion that individuals' preferences over procedures reflect their material self-interest is at the heart of contributions that interpret the emergence of political institutions as the result of rational agents' anticipation of how alternative institutional choices will affect individual (or group-specific) benefits. In an influential study, Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) explain the extension of the franchise on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis of incumbent rulers who grant the right of political participation to the broad population in order to reduce the threat of upheaval and revolution. 4 Aghion et al. (2004) describe the optimal distribution of power in a society as reflecting a trade-off between efficient decisionmaking and the control of a potentially self-serving ruler. In their analysis, they both derive the constitutional design that is desirable behind the veil of ignorance, and the design that is likely to emerge once (wealth) heterogeneity and individiuals' conflicting interests are explicitly taken into account. Ticchi and Vindigni (2009) relate the choice among alternative democratic constitutions (majoritarian vs. consensual) to the underlying economic inequality, while Robinson and Torvik (2016) describe the emergence of presidentialism as resulting from a struggle between groups that differ with respect to their political orientation, but also with respect to their preferences over the provision of public goods. Acemoglu et al. (2015) show how the evolution of coalitions between different groups in society gives rise to changing patterns of political liberalization and repression. Finally, Mukand and Rodrik (2015) define liberal democracy as an institutional setting that combines the protection of property rights, electoral rights, and minority rights, and show that its emergence is rather an exception than the rule, relying on a specific constellation of group sizes as well as social and identity cleavages.
What unites the contributions mentioned above is the premise that individuals (or groups) never value specific constitutional choices per se, but that they favor those procedures that are most likely to further their own -usually material -interests. From a political science perspective, this logic seems surprisingly poor. For example, preferences for "democratic innovations", i.e. non-representative forms of decision-4 Aidt and Franck (2015) offer a recent empirical analysis that supports the "preemptive democratization" hypothesis of Acemoglu and Robinson (2000) . 5 making such as direct democracy or deliberative citizen forums are explained as the result of the more general value shift towards post-materialism (see Inglehart 1990 ), referring to the idea that, in times of affluence, non-material values, including political participation, become more important than wealth. According to this view, citizens demand ever more opportunities to have a direct say in policy-making, they become "critical citizens" (Norris 1999) . A number of contributions that study citizens' attitudes towards specific democratic decision-making procedures point out the importance of differing normative conceptions of representation and democracy for procedural preferences (Wenzel, Bowler et al. 2000; Bengtsson and Wass 2010; Landwehr and Steiner 2017) . In these studies, support for specific procedures or reforms of them is regarded as derived from a more comprehensive understanding of democracy in which values such as equality, autonomy, the protection of liberties as well as institutional capacity and effectiveness are weighed and combined.
The idea that individuals' assessment of alternative decision-making procedures does not just depend on their material interests is also underlying those contributions that emphasize the gains in individual well-being associated with the possibility of participating in the political process Frey 2005, 2006;  Pacheco and Lange 2010) as well as theoretical and empirical analyses of procedural fairness (Tyler and Lind 2000, Bolton et al. 2005) . Moreover, it is reflected in the concept of "expressive voting", which "…captures the idea that voting may be motivated by concerns other than a concern for the eventual outcome of the electionconcerns that are more directly and immediately linked to the act of voting, or of voting for a particular candidate or option, itself" (Hamlin and Jennings 2011: 645) .
Finally, our analysis explores the role of material interests in determining individuals' support for referenda as a particular procedure to decide on redistributive taxation. It is thus also related to the voluminous literature on the determinants and effects of direct democracy, as surveyed, e.g., by Matsusaka (2008) , and to contributions that analyze how the use of referenda as a decision-making procedure affects fiscal outcomes like government spending, public debt, and taxation (Feld and Kirchgässner 2001 , Funk and Gathmann 2011 , Asatryan et al. 2017a , Asatryan et al. 2017b ). Even closer to our analysis are those studies that use survey or voting data to identify the determinants of people's support for direct democracy (Donovan and Karp 2006 , Bowler et al. 2007 , Dyck and Baldassare 2009 , Collingwood 2012 , Arnold et al. 2016 ). None of these contributions, however, shares our focus on a specific policy 6 issue -i.e. redistributive taxation -and none of them explicitly elicits individuals' expectations on the majority opinion.
Distributional interests, expectations, and individuals' support for referenda:

A simple model
On the following pages, we will develop a simple model that allows disentangling the various forces which potentially determine an individual's choice between alternative procedures. More specifically, we will differentiate between individuals' substantial policy preferences -here, on redistributive taxation -and their procedural preferences, which refer to the way the decision on a given policy issue is taken. These procedural preferences can be intrinsic, i.e. the support for a given procedure is independent of, and unaffected by substantial preferences, or they may be instrumental, i.e. support for a specific procedure is conditional on the belief that it will bring about desired outcomes. 5 We consider an economy that is inhabited by a large number of individuals who are indexed by i and receive an exogenous income i y . The cross-sectional distribution of incomes is common knowledge, characterized by an average income y and a median income y  , and skewed to the right, i.e. y y   . The government levies a linear income tax and uniformly redistributes tax revenues among all citizens. For simplicity, we assume that redistribution is restricted to being either complete ( 1   ) or totally absent ( 0   ). The decision on the tax rate  is either taken through a referendum or by the government tossing a coin.
We assume that individuals' preferences over decision-making procedures have an intrinsic component, which assesses different procedures according to their inherent fairness, transparency, feasibility etc., and an instrumental component, which reflects the utility an individual derives from the outcome she expects as resulting from a given procedure. 6 We thus write individual i's total utility as
In Harms and Landwehr (2017) , we further discuss this difference and explore the importance of intrinsic vs. instrumental procedural preferences with respect to a wide array of policy issues. The utility an individual derives from a specific tax rate   i U  is a linear function of her after-tax income and of a term that reflects her general attitude towards taxation:
 is positive, individual i has a generally critical attitude towards taxation, regardless of her own income position. This may be because she emphasizes the potentially detrimental incentive effects associated with higher taxes. Conversely, a negative value of i  reflects a generally positive attitude towards taxation -due, e.g., to inequity aversion (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) 
Note that, since i  is based on individual i's personal beliefs, the expected outcome of the referendum is subjective, too. The expression in (3) is a slightly modified version of Meltzer and Richard's (1981) Obviously, all individuals are aware that the coin toss results in 1   with a probability of 0.5, and in 0   with a probability of 0.5, hence
The condition in (5) illustrates that an individual's support for referenda as a procedure to decide on redistributive taxation depends on the following factors:
-The higher the general appeal of direct democracy for individual i ( i  ), the greater the likelihood that she chooses a referendum as a procedure to decide on taxation for given expectations about the majority's opinion and a given relative income position.
-If  = 0, instrumental motives are irrelevant, and an individual's support for using a referendum to decide on taxation only depends on her general attitude towards direct democracy. Neither an individual's income, nor her expectation about the majority's opinion or her general attitude towards redistribution matter. In what follows, we will start by analyzing the relationship between individuals' income and their attitude towards higher taxes. In a next step, we will explore whether we can reject the hypothesis that material motives are irrelevant in determining individuals' support for the use of referenda to decide on redistributive taxation, i.e. that  = 0.
When doing so, we can exploit the fact that our data set offers information on the different variables that enter the expression in (5).
Data
To identify the importance of material interests in shaping individuals' attitudes towards the use of referenda, we designed a survey experiment that was fielded via the GESIS The main dependent variable in our survey is the discrete choice of the procedure "referendum" over alternative procedures for a decision about redistributive taxation. More specifically, participants were asked the following question:
"Currently, there is a lot of discussion about fair taxation and tax policy. How do you think a decision about this should be taken? a) After a public debate, a referendum should be held. On the subsequent screen, we asked participants about their own substantial attitudes on the matter: "Are you in favor or against implementing a higher tax on high incomes?"
Respondents reacted by choosing an answer on a five-point scale ranging from "absolutely in favor" (1) to "absolutely against" (5). In our subsequent regressions, we will turn this information into the dummy variable No_higher_taxes, which takes a value of one if an individual stated to be against or absolutely against higher taxes.
On a third and final screen, we asked participants about their assessment of the majority opinion: "Do you think that, in Germany, there is a majority in favor or against higher taxes on high incomes?" Again, respondents could choose their answer on a five-point scale, ranging from "clear majority in favor of higher taxes" (1) to "clear majority against higher taxes" (5). The answer to this question allows us to identify individuals' expectations about the outcome of a referendum: if a respondent expects a clear majority to be in favor of higher taxes on the rich, she or he expects these taxes to materialize if tax policy is decided by means of a referendum. Hence, the answer to this question reflects the sign of the expression
The additional information we use in our analysis concerns individuals' gender, individual's eligibility to enroll at a university or a university of applied sciences.
The income variables are, of course, of central relevance to our research question: The GESIS survey records individuals' income both at the personal and at the household level. For reasons detailed below, we will focus on the information given on respondents' net household income. 11 Income may fall into one of nine brackets, with the lowest bracket (1) comprising all incomes below 900 Euros per month, and the highest bracket (9) comprising all incomes of 6000 Euros per month and above. In the subsequent analysis, we will start by using these categories as regressors.
However, this may be problematic, since the distance between the brackets' boundaries increases as we move towards higher incomes. As an alternative, we therefore use the medium value within each bracket as a regressor. This leaves us with the problem of how to treat the top bracket (net household incomes per month above 6000 Euros). Fortunately, we can rely on the information provided by German statistical authorities (Destatis 2015), which report the share of households within certain income brackets, but also the average income of households within these brackets. Appendix 2 describes how we use this information in order to assign the value of 8700 Euros per month to the top income bracket in the GESIS panel.
This, however, leaves us with the question how much every individual earner within a household actually brings home: while a net income of 5000 Euros in a singleincome household would put that entity among Germans' top earners, the same amount earned by a two-adult household looks less impressive. Since GESIS provides information on household size and on the number of children below 16, we adopt two approaches: The first one defines the number of income earners as the difference between the size of the household and the number of children younger than 16 years -suggesting that there may be more than two income earners in a household. The second approach only admits single-earner and double-earner households, with the in 1943 or earlier (1995 or later). However, these variables were never significant, such that we eventually dropped them. We also abstained from using both the level and the squared value of Age since it turned out that the latter was not significant in any specification.
latter defined by a number of children which is smaller than the total household size minus one. 12 An obvious alternative would be to consider respondents' personal income, as reported in the GESIS panel. However, the focus of official German statistics on household incomes makes it hard to reliably define the income of individuals in the top bracket. Moreover, individuals living in the same household are likely to define their distributional interests with respect to household income rather than personal income.
13 According to Destatis (2015) , 15 percent of all households in Germany report to receive an income below 1700 Euros per month, 48 percent report to receive an income above 3600 Euros, and 27 percent report an income above 5000 Euros. Since the distribution within the 3600-5000 bracket is likely to be skewed to the right, we believe that the share of households in Germany that receive a net income above 4000 Euros is not much higher than the 31 percent of the GESIS panel.
14 Item cfba067a of the GESIS panel allows assessing whether respondents know their relative income position by asking them if they consider their financial wealth to be (far) below average, or (far) above average. It turns out that this perception is highly correlated with respondents' reported (household) income level.
14 distribution of i  , this suggests that respondents with a higher income are less likely to be enthusiastic about more redistributive taxation.
To check this claim, we start by running a regression that uses the binary variable No_higher_taxes as a regressand: as described in the previous section, this variable takes on a value of one if respondents are against or strongly against higher taxes on high incomes, and a value of zero otherwise. As regressors, we use the dummy variable Female, respondents' Age, a dummy for their educational attainment (University entrance degree) and, most importantly, a variable reflecting individuals'
Income:
No_higher_taxes Income
In equation (6), the vector xk reflects the control variables mentioned above. We estimate this equation both by using the OLS estimator -the "linear probability model"
-and the logit estimator. Table 1 gives coefficients and t-statistics (based on a robust covariance matrix) for the OLS estimates, and average marginal effects and robust tstatistics for the logit estimates. Interestingly, Age has a consistently negative effect on respondents' opposition against higher taxes. Less surprisingly, Income has a positive effect for all variants. This supports the claim that individuals are well aware of their material interests when defining their attitude towards tax policy. Ceteris paribus, a respondent in the top-income category (9) is 17 percentage points more likely to reject higher taxes than a respondent in the bottom income category (1). The dummies for high-and low household income also have the expected effect -with high-income earners being more likely to reject higher taxes and low-income earners being less likely to be against higher taxes. However, the t-statistic of the low-income dummy narrowly misses the threshold for a 90-percent significance level. Table 1 near here The results in Table 1 confirm our conjecture that individuals' rejection of higher taxes increases in their income. However, while the model of Section 3 used the simplifying assumption that an individual's general attitude towards taxation, as reflected by the parameter i  , was uncorrelated with her income, this assumption may not be satisfied in reality. More specifically, it might be the case that rich individuals hold stronger views about the disincentive effects and economy-wide losses associated with high tax rates.
If this were correct, the estimated effect of individuals' income on the attitude towards higher taxes would not necessarily reflect their material interests. In order to account for this possibility, we explicitly control for i  by using a variable from the OctoberDecember 2015 wave of the GESIS panel, i.e. the wave that took place roughly one year before individuals were asked about their attitude towards higher taxes. In that wave, respondents were asked to give their general opinion on the government's role in reducing economic inequalities. More specifically, they were confronted with the following statement: "The government should enforce the reduction of differences between the poor and the rich." Answers could be given on a seven-point scale from 1 (fully agree) to 7 (fully disagree). Based on this information, we constructed the variable No_redistribution, which takes a value of 1 if respondents chose 6 or 7, i.e. uttered a strongly negative attitude towards redistribution. Including this variable as an additional regressor in the above equation allowed controlling for other motives that may instill skepticism towards higher taxes and that may be correlated with respondents' income. Table 2 demonstrates that, not surprisingly, a generally negative view on the government's role in reducing economic inequalities significantly raises the probability that survey participants are against or strongly against higher taxes imposed on the rich. Interestingly, however, there is an additional effect of income, no matter whether we simply use the income categories defined by the GESIS panel, or consider monetary magnitudes, either for the total household, or on a per-earner basis. 15 We interpret these results as evidence that material self-interest is important in defining participants' attitude vis-à-vis tax policy: even if we control for the possibility that participants may reject redistribution for reasons that have nothing to do with their own interests -e.g. because of general concerns about fairness or economic efficiency 15 Using wave-c information on respondents' age, gender, educational attainment and income, we found that women are less likely to reject government intervention to reduce "differences between the poor and the rich", while educational attainment and income have a significantly positive effect on No redistribution. Hence, the total -direct and indirect -effect of the right-hand-side variables in equation (6) on people's rejection of higher taxes may actually be higher than suggested by the coefficients displayed in Table 2 .
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-we find that richer individuals are more likely to oppose higher taxes. 16 Endowed with these insights, we will now turn to the question whether material self-interest also affects individuals' support of referenda as a procedure to decide on tax policy.
Household income and individuals' support for referenda on taxation
As mentioned above, economic self-interest does not have to be the only motive that guides individuals' attitudes towards various constitutional designs. In fact, material motives may even be of second-order importance, and individuals may support direct democracy simply because they consider it a democratic, participatory and transparent way of arriving at public decisions. Or they may reject direct democracy because they anticipate the peril of voters succumbing to populist rhetorics. In the model of Section 3, the relative importance of intrinsic (as opposed to instrumental) motives was captured by the parameter . The goal of this section is to test whether we can reject the hypothesis that = 0, i.e. that procedural choices are completely dominated by intrinsic considerations. This, of course, requires to specify the empirical model such that it properly reflects individuals' material interests.
To achieve our goal, we use the information already described in Section 4: the GESIS panel asks respondents to state which procedure should be used to decide on the question whether higher taxes are imposed on the rich. In a first step, we explore whether an individual's income per se has an effect on the likelihood that she picks a referendum.
However, we must be aware that an individual's attitude towards referenda as a procedure to decide on taxation may be driven by a generally positive or critical attitude vis-à-vis direct democracy. This, in fact, was the role of the parameter i  in the model of Section 3. If this parameter is correlated with i y , a negative coefficient of an individual's income does not necessarily prove the importance of material interests. 16 As an additional check, we tested whether accounting for respondents' expectations about their future financial situation changed our results. Using individuals' reply to item debl244a in the GESIS panel ("I expect that my financial situation will be significantly improved in the near future "), we found that, ceteris paribus, participants with an optimistic view on their financial future were more likely to reject higher taxes imposed on the rich. However, including this variable in the regression had no impact on the effect of current income.
To control for i  , we therefore use a variable from the December-2015 wave of the GESIS panel, which reflects respondents' general view on referenda. Specifically, this item confronted respondents with the following statement: "There should be more referenda in Germany." Participants could choose on a seven-point scale, reaching from "fully disagree" (1) to "fully agree" (7). Including this variable (Referendum_Preference) in our regression controls for all motives -instrumental and intrinsic -that may determine an agent's general view on direct democracy. It thus helps to isolate the effect of individuals' income on their choice of referenda as a procedure to decide on tax policy. 17 We control for other characteristics that might affect individuals' view on whether referenda should be used to decide on taxation by controlling for respondents' age (Age) and by using dummy variables that reflect respondents' gender (Female), their educational attainment (University entrance degree), as well as their citizenship
(German citizen).
We start by ignoring the role of individuals' expectations about the outcome of a referendum and estimate the following equation:
, Referendum is a dummy variable which equals 1 if respondent i chooses a referendum as a procedure to decide on tax policy, and zero otherwise. As in Section 5, we estimate this equation using both OLS and the logit estimator. Table 3 gives coefficients, average marginal effects (for logit estimation), and t-statistics based on robust standard errors. 
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The coefficients in the first row of Table 3 indicate that, indeed, individuals' general enthusiasm for direct democracy has a strong effect on their view whether referenda should be used as a procedure to decide on tax policy. In addition, older and bettereducated individuals are less likely to support the use of referenda for this policy issue.
However, there does not seem to be a separate effect of income that goes beyond its influence on agents' general attitude towards direct democracy. 18 In the light of the model presented in Section 3, the irrelevance of individuals' income for their support of referenda on taxation does not come as a surprise. As we have demonstrated in Section 3, the marginal effect of income depends on the sign of Tables 1 to 3 suggest that the OLS coefficients don't differ substantially from the average marginal effects for the logit estimator -we decided to estimate equation (8) by OLS. Table 4 near here The results presented in Table 4 indicate that the negative influence of Age and University entrance degree on the support for referenda over taxation can still be observed for the new specification. Moreover, Attitudes_aligned has a strictly positive impact on individuals' support for referenda while Attitudes_contrasting does not seem to matter: apparently a respondent's enthusiasm for direct democracy is significantly enhanced if the majority is expected to share her or his opinion. Conversely, the expectation that a clear majority holds a view which is in contrast to one's own opinion does not seem to affect individuals' attitude towards referenda. Most importantly, while respondents' income and expecations about the majority per se do not have a significant impact on their attitude towards referenda, the coefficient of the interaction term is significantly negative for columns (1) to (8). This suggests that -regardless of her/his general attitude towards direct democracy -a higher (lower) income reduces (raises) an individual's support for referenda as a procedure to decide on taxation if she or he expects a clear majority in favor of more redistribution. Columns (9) and (10) which use the dummy variables for high and low household income as well as their interactions with the Majority variable suggest that the effect of income is predominantly driven by the low-income recipients: ceteris paribus -i.e. regardless of agents' income position -the expectation of a clear majority in favor of higher taxes 21 dampens individuals' support for direct democracy (see the fourth and fifth row in columns (9) and (10)). Enthusiasm for referenda is further reduced for participants who receive a low income. However, if these participants expect a clear majority in favor of taxation, the likelihood of supporting a referendum as a procedure to decide on tax policy increases substantially. More specifically, the results displayed in column (10) suggest that participants who expect a clear majority to support taxation are 12
percentage points less likely to choose a referendum than (otherwise identical) persons who either have no clear view on the majority position or expect the majority to oppose higher taxes. By contrast, a low-income individual who expects the majority to be in favor of higher taxes is 23 percentage points more likely to pick 'referendum' as her preferred procedure than a low-income individual without such expectations, and 27 percentage points more likely to pick a referendum than an individual who does not receive a low income, but shares these expectations. While it is surprising that we do not find a particularly strong opposition against referenda by those high-income individuals who expect a majority in favor of higher taxes, our results support the notion that material interest does play an important role for individuals' preferences over decision-making procedures.
So far, our analysis has focused on respondents' choice of referenda as a procedure to decide on taxation, lumping together all other procedures -parliamentary decisions, expert decisions, decisions after deliberation among all affected groupsinto one (composite) "alternative choice". In a last step, we test whether individuals'
income -combined with their expectations about the majority's position -also affects the support for these other procedures. If the pattern discernible in Table 4 were also discernible for alternative ways of arriving at a decision, our findings would lose a lot of their bite, since we argued that the clear relationship between majority expectations and anticipated policy outcomes is a specific property of referenda. We thus re-ran regression (8), subsequently replacing the dependent variable Referendum by dummy variables (Parliament, Experts, Deliberation) that took a value of one whenever a respondent chose one of these procedures. Once more, we used the OLS regressor.
And to save space, we restricted our attention to two particular versions of equation (8) -the one that used the level of net household income (in million Euros) as a proxy for respondents' prosperity, and the one that used the high-and low-income dummies.
Moreover, we only show the results for the specifications that used the Majority pro tax dummy to represent respondents' expectation about the majority's opinion. 19 Table 5 near here For the sake of comparability, the first two columns of Table 5 replicate columns (4) and (10) of Table 4 , i.e. the effect of agents' characteristics, income, and expectations on the likelihood of preferring a referendum. The coefficients and significance levels shown in the other columns support our conjecture that respondents' household income, combined with their expectation on the majority opinion, are particularly relevant for their choice of referenda as a decision-making procedure. By contrast, these variables do not seem to matter for respondents' support or rejection of parliamentary decisions. Interestingly, however, respondents tend to support expert decisions when they expect a majority to be in favor of higher taxes, but the enthusiasm for this procedure is substantially muted for low-income respondents who share these expectations. Understandably, this group of individuals prefers the use of referenda to decide on taxation. Finally, a higher income per se seems to reduce individuals' support for deliberative procedures that give a voice to all affected groups, but this result is neither driven by low-income nor by high-income individuals. There is thus no other procedure for which individual support, ceteris paribus, depends on the specific combination of income and majority expectations as it is the case for referenda. We interpret these results as further evidence that material motives affect individuals' preferences over procedures.
Summary and conclusions
While few economists would contest the idea that individuals' attitudes towards specific policy issues -e.g. redistributive taxation -reflect their material self-interest, it is far less obvious that such considerations should also play a role at the constitutional stage,
i.e. when the rules of the political process are defined. It could be argued that values 19 Running these regressions for the full set of income variables and using the variable Majority attitude on taxation as an alternative to the Majority pro tax dummy yielded similar results. Moreover, while the inclusion of Referendum_Preference enhances the explanatory power of our model, it does not affect the other qualitative results displayed in While our results indicate that the traditional political-economic, interest-based explanation of constitutional choices is alive and well, we also have to stress that our findings do not rule out the relevance of intrinsic motives for procedural preferences in general, and for supporting referenda and direct democracy in particular: as we have argued above, the highly significant variable Referendum preference is likely to reflect a mix of intrinsic and instrumental considerations. Moreover, the generally low R 2 values, which our study shares with most survey-based empirical analyses, signals that we are still far away from completely understanding procedural choices.
Nevertheless, our findings demonstrate that material self-interest is a factor to be taken seriously when it comes to explaining individuals' attitudes towards referenda.
References
Acemoglu, D. and J. A. Robinson (2000) . "Why did the West extend the franchise? Democracy, inequality, and growth in historical perspective." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 115(4): 1167-1199. Tables   Table 1: The effect of income on the rejection of imposing higher taxes on the rich (-3.958 )*** (-3.946)*** (-3.857)*** (-3.800)*** (-3.618)*** (-3.493)*** (-3.705)*** (-3.647)*** (-3.908)*** (-3.908 
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